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1Enhancing Secrecy Rate in Cognitive Radio
Networks via Multi-level Stackelberg Game
Abstract—In this letter, physical layer (PHY) security is in-
vestigated for both primary and secondary transmissions of a
cognitive radio network (CRN) that is in danger of malicious
attempt by an eavesdropper (ED). In our proposed system, the
secondary transmitter (ST) is acted as a trusted relay (TR) for
primary transmission and the PHY security is facilitated by the
cooperation between the primary transmitter (PT) and the ST us-
ing the multi-level Stackelberg game. In particular, we formulate
and then solve the optimization problem of maximizing secrecy
rates in different phases of primary and secondary transmissions.
Finally, numerical examples are provided to demonstrate that
the spectrum leasing based on trading secondary access for
cooperation is a promising framework for enhancing secrecy rate
in CRNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative jamming received significant attention over the
past few years to increase physical layer (PHY) security. Co-
operative jamming prescribes creating judicious interference
by transmitting noise to impair the eavesdroppers’ ability in
decoding the confidential information [1]. The open nature
of the wireless medium makes the transmission susceptible to
malicious eavesdropping [2]. To cope with it, the authors in [3]
proposed secondary cooperation to maximize the secrecy rate
of the primary network while satisfying a required secondary
rate of the secondary network. This is achieved by an optimal
design of a beamformer at the multi-antenna secondary trans-
mitter (ST) to generate interference to confuse eavesdroppers
(EDs). The secrecy rate maximization problem is studied in [4]
using game theory, where the jammer introduces charges for its
jamming service based on the amount of interference caused
to the EDs. This problem is formulated into a Stackelberg
game, where the jammer and the transmitter play the roles of
leader and follower of the game. In [5], the authors focused on
maximizing secrecy rate and information rate of the cognitive
radio networks (CRNs), where two secondary users acted as
relay and jammer.
The aforementioned works focused on enhancing the se-
crecy rate for primary transmission and information rate for
secondary transmission, with the assumption that the ED
can intercept the primary transmission only. Inspired by the
study in [6], we propose a new scenario where the primary
transmitter (PT) allows the ST to access its spectrum for better
secrecy performance. Here, we consider a more realistic case
where the ED can intercept both the primary and secondary
transmissions (i.e,, the worst case of security). In our approach,
the ST is used as a trusted relay (TR) and a jammer for primary
transmission. We also assume that PT and ST can allocate
some of its transmission power to transmit the artificial noise
to create interference at the ED. In a such network, a primary
user may lease portions of a licensed spectrum to a secondary
user in exchange for enhanced performance. This scenario
avoids the regulatory issues that commonly hinder the im-
plementation of the property-rights spectrum leasing concept.
In our considered system, the primary users always have first
priority and the secondary users are trying to maximize their
benefits given the existence of primary users. This fits perfectly
the model of leader and follower in the Stackelberg game.
In addition, the ST also acts as a trusted relay to support
and speed up the completion of the primary transmission.
We therefore propose a novel multi-level game to reflect
considered system model. The main contributions of this letter
are detailed as follows:
• Using a Stackelberg game, we propose a resource alloca-
tion scheme (i.e. power and time resource) for spectrum
leasing to maximize secrecy rates in different phases of
primary and secondary transmissions (PSR), given the
perfect knowledge of channel state information (CSI).
• We obtain the unique equilibrium value of the proposed
Stackelberg game.
• We show that the secrecy rate of the proposed system
using multi-level Stackelberg game is significantly higher
than that using the single level Stackelberg game..
• Comparisons with previous works are provided to show
the significant improvement of security in the proposed
system.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
We consider a CRN where the primary transmission in-
cludes a pair of the PT and primary receiver (PR), and the
secondary transmission includes a pair of the ST and sec-
ondary receiver (SR). All transmissions within the network is
under threat from malicious attempt of an ED. Note that the ST
will act as a TR in the second phase of primary transmission
(so we interchange the names TR and ST depending the phase
of transmission it is in). We assume the following: i) there is
no direct transmission between the PT and the PR; ii) each
node carries a single omnidirectional antenna; iii) the relaying
strategy of decode-and-forward (DF) is considered; iv) global
CSI is available by a standard channel estimator (CE) (e.g.,
[7]); and v) a-priori knowledge of jamming signals is available
at legitimate receivers. Note that the last assumption can be
achieved by the process of communicating the keys of artificial
noise between the legal source and destination in two steps:
The phase response of the channel is probed first, and then, the
information bearing signal is modified to pre-compensate for
the phase effects of the channel. Since the channels between
the legal source and destination are completely different from
the channels between the legal source and EDs, this process
is secure [8], [9]. To enhance secrecy rates, we allow the
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transmit a jamming signal, in addition to transmitting their
message signal.
In our system, we propose three phases of transmissions as
follows: i) Phase 1 - primary transmission of information from
the PT to the TR (i.e, the ST); ii) Phase 2 - relay transmission
of primary information from the TR to the PR; and iii) Phase
3 - secondary transmission of information from the ST to the
SR. Because the ED can intercept any transmission during
these three phases, our objective is to improve the secrecy
rates of all transmission via transmitting appropriate jamming
signals. For convenience, we define different secrecy rates
according to each phase above as follows: primary secrecy
rate (PSR) is used to refer to secrecy rate achieved in Phase
1 (primary transmission); relay secrecy rate (RSR) is used
for secrecy rate achieved in Phase 2 (relay transmission); and
finally, secondary secrecy rate (SSR) is used for secrecy rate
achieved in Phase 3 (secondary transmission). In particular,
the signals received in each phase are as follows:
Phase 1: Using a fraction of the considered time slot (1−α)
where 0 < α < 1, PT sends its message signal and ST acts
as the relay to receive as follows
xST =
√
1Pphpss1 +
√
(1− 1)Pphpsz1 + nST , (1)
where s1 is the message signal, z1 ∼ CN (0, 1) is the artificial
noise, nST ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the noise at the ST, 1 is the PT’s
fraction of allocated power Pp for transmission of primary
message (0 < 1 < 1) and hps ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel
coefficient between the PT and ST. For notational convenience,
let us define ρps = Pp |hps|2 /σ2 and ρpe = Pp |hpe|2 /σ2,
where hpe is the channel coefficient between the PT and ED.
We assume that ST has a-priori knowledge of artificial noise.
The achievable secrecy rate PSR at Phase 1, denoted by RPSR,
can be calculated as follows
RPSR = (1− α)
[
log2(1 + 1ρps)− log2
(
(1 + ρpe)
1 + (1− 1)ρpe
)]
Phase 2: The ST acts as a trusted relay to forward secure
primary message to the PR in the fraction αβ of the considered
timeslot (0 < α, β < 1). The received signal at PR is
xPR =
√
2Pshspsˆ1 +
√
(1− 2)Pshspz2 + nPR, (2)
where sˆ1 is the re-encoded message signal of s1, z2 ∼
CN (0, 1) is the artificial noise, 2 is the ST’s fraction of allo-
cated power Ps for relaying of primary message (0 < 2 < 1)
and hsp ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between the
ST and the PR. After removing the artificial noise at the PR,
the achievable secrecy rate RSR at Phase 2, denoted by RRSR,
can be calculated as follows:
RRSR = (αβ) [log2(1 + 2ρsp)
− log2
(
1 + ρse + (1− 1)ρpe
1 + (1− 2)ρse + (1− 1)ρpe
)]
,(3)
where ρsp = Ps |hsp|2 /σ2, ρse = Ps |hse|2 /σ2, and hse is
the channel coefficient between the ST and ED.
Phase 3: The ST sends its own secure secondary message
to the SR in the remaining timeslot fraction α(1 − β). The
received signal at SR can be written as follows:
xSR =
√
2Pshsss2 +
√
(1− 2)Pshssz2 + nSR, (4)
where s2 is the secondary message signal and hss ∼
CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficients between the ST and SR.
We assume that same codewords of artificial noise are used in
both of primary and secondary transmission (i.e., the same z2).
After removing the artificial noise at the SR, we can obtain
the secrecy rate at Phase 3, denoted by RSSR, as follows:
RSSR = α(1− β) [log2(1 + 2ρss)
− log2(
1 + ρse + (1− 1)ρpe
1 + (1− 2)ρse + (1− 1)ρpe )
]
(5)
where ρss = Ps |hss|2 /σ2.
III. SECRECY RATES AS A GAME THEORETIC MODEL
Throughout this work, the nodes are defined as selfish and
rational to mimic a non-altruistic behavior. An appropriate
framework for analyzing the interaction between such nodes is
muti-level Stackelberg game. If this game includes M players
with N levels, then the lth player is the follower of the (l−1)th
player at the ith level and is a leader of the (l + 1)th player
at the (i + 1)th level, where 1 < i < N and 1 < l < M.
Furthermore, the first player is the leader at the first level and
the M th player is the follower at the N th level. In general, the
number of levels is equal to the number of players minus one
(i.e., N =M−1). For demonstration, in this section, we apply
two levels only of the Stackelberg game, as shown in Fig.1,
to maximize the secrecy rate in each phase of transmission.
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Fig. 1: Two-level Stackelberg game of proposed system
A. Level 1
The leader and follower are the PT (Phase 1) and the TR
(i.e., the ST in Phase 2), respectively. We can find the optimal
value ∗1 to maximize the secrecy rate of the leader as follows
∗1 = argmax
1
RPSR. (6)
Lemma 1. The secrecy rate at Phase 1 in (2) is concave in
terms of 1.
Proof: In order to prove the concavity of the primary
transmission’s utility, we derive the second derivative of (2)
with respect to 1 as follows:
∂2RPSR
∂21
= q1
[
(− ρ
2
ps
(1 + 1ρps)2
− ρ
2
pe
(1 + (1− 1)ρpe)2 )
]
(7)
where q1 = (1−α)/ln 2. Obviously, this second derivative in
(7) is negative and RPSR is concave in terms of 1.
3According to Lemma 1, we can find ∗1 from solving the
following equation:
∂RPSR
∂1
= q1
[
ρps
(1 + 1ρps)
− ρpe
(1 + (1− 1)ρpe)
]
= 0, (8)
leading to
∗1 =
ρps − ρpe + ρpsρpe
2ρpsρpe
. (9)
The follower then tries to maximize its secrecy rate RRSR too.
But because the follower of Level 1 also plays the role of the
leader of Level 2, we will describe the maximization process
of RRSR in the next subsection.
B. Level 2
At Level 2, the leader and follower are the TR (i.e, the ST
in Phase 2) and the ST (in Phase 3), respectively. The optimal
primary strategy ∗1 , relay transmitter strategy (α
∗, β∗) and
the corresponding power choice of the secondary transmitter
2
∗ are jointly referred as the Stackelberg equilibrium. The ST
is aware of parameters (α, β) and optimizes its power level
towards the goal of maximizing its utility:
USSR(α, β, 
∗
1, 2(α, β)) = RSSR − k2, (10)
where k is pricing constant. According to Lemma 1, the utility
of secondary transmission in (10) is also concave in terms of
2. The optimal solution of secondary transmission problem
can be found as
2
∗ = argmaxUSSR(α, β, ∗1, 2(α, β)), (11)
subject to 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < 2 < 1. To find
optimum 2∗, we can differentiate Ussec with respect to 2
and equate it to zero. After simplification, we can obtain 2
by solving the equation a22+b2+c = 0, where a = ρssρse,
b = ρse − ρss − ρssρse − ρssρpe(1 − 1∗) − (2ρssρseq/k),
c = (q/k)(ρss − ρse + ρssρse + ρssρpe(1− 1∗))− ρse − 1−
ρpe(1−1∗). Then, we can obtain the two roots of 2, denoted
by ∗(1)2 and 
∗(2)
2 .
Furthermore, the relay transmission determines the fraction
α and ratio β towards the goal of maximizing its secrecy rate,
knowing that its decision will affect the strategy selected by
the ST in Phase 3, ad follows
α∗, β∗ = arg max
0<α,β,1,2<1
RRSR(α, β, 1
∗, 2∗(α, β)). (12)
Theorem 1. The allocated power levels ∗1, ∗2 and time slot
fraction α∗ are the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game.
Proof: According to DF scheme, we assume that the
transmission rate from the ST to the PR in Phase 2, denoted
by Rsp, is not greater than the transmission rate from the the
PT to the ST in Phase 1, denoted by, Rps. We can consider the
equality is the optimal case to find the relationship between
α and β to facilitate the solution of the above optimization
problem:
Rsp = Rps ⇒ β = (1− α)
α
log2(1 + ρps)
log2(1 + ρsp)
. (13)
According to Lemma 1, in Phases 1 and 3, RPSR and USSR
are strictly concave in terms of 1 and 2 for a given values
of α and β. Furthermore, RRSR is an increasing function of
α then the relay transmission (leader) in Level 2 will select
the best responses ∗1 of leader in Level 1 and 
∗
2(α) of the
follower in Level 2 as follows:
α∗ = argmaxRRSR(α, ∗1, 
∗
2(α)). (14)
Therefore, α∗, ∗1 and 
∗
2(α
∗) form the Nash equilibrium of
the proposed Stackelberg game.
Lemma 2. The N-level Stackelberg game has higher secrecy
rate than the (N-1)-level Stackelberg game.
Proof: For convenience, we consider N = 2 for the
proof. The general case can be similarly achieved. In the
single-level game, we assume the PT is out of range of
the ED to remove the impact of the PT (leader in Level 1)
which is represented by 1. In this case, we need the single-
level Stackelberg game between relay transmission (leader)
and secondary transmission (follower). According to the same
procedure of Phases 2 and 3 in aforementioned study of the
multi-level Stackelbrg game, we can find the following single-
level primary secrecy rate, which is actually relay secrecy rate
and denoted by RRSR(1), as follows
RRSR
(1) = αβ
[
log2(1 + 2ρsp)− log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− 2)ρse) )
]
.
To highlight the enhancement of primary secrecy rate by
2-level Stackelberg game, we need to prove that RRSR −
RRSR
(1) > 0. This is obvious because Rsp = log2(1+ 2ρsp)
is the same in both single- and two-level games while in the
second term of (3), we have ρpe(1− 1) > 0.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results and some
related discussions. We consider two optimization problems
from the previous section according to the Stackelberg game.
Our simulation consists of two steps as follows: Firstly, we
Fig. 2: Comparison for primary secrecy rate
consider the following parameters to provide same setting as
4previous study in [5] : Ps = 2mW, noise variance σ2 = 1mW,
pricing factor c1 = 0.25, |Hps|2 = 0.6, |Hse|2 = 0.3
and |Hss|2 = 0.8. Fig.2 evaluates our proposed scenario by
comparing it with previous study, which used two secondary
users: one for relay and another one for non-friendly jammer.
In [6], the authors proposed relay and jammer (R-J) and equal-
duration relay jammer (EDRJ) schemes to enhance secrecy
rate in CR. Fig.2 plot the secrecy rate versus the channel gain
between legitimate source and destination (hSD). The main
difference between EDRJ and R-J schemes is that the time
durations for the first two phases in EDRJ are equal and the
secrecy rate is maximized without considering time allocation.
It is shown that our proposed system outperforms the R-J and
EDRJ schemes significantly due to no interference at legal
receiver by being able to remove the artificial noise at the
receiver, and the increased interference at eavesdropper due
to the interaction between two levels of Stackelberg game.
Secondly, to find the effect of signal to noise ratio (SNR)
Fig. 3: Secrecy rate comparison versus SNR
on the secrecy rates in three phases. We fix the locations of
the PT, PR, ST, ED and SR at the coordinates (0.2,0),(0.6,
0), (0, 0),(0,1) and (0, 0.4), respectively. We assume the path
loss model hij = d−δ with path loss exponent δ = 3.0 and
the pricing coefficient k = 0.25. Fig.3 shows the optimum
primary secrecy rates of the single- and two-level games versus
the SNR. It is noted that the PSR is improved by the multi-
level Stackelberg game, which is consistent with our finding
in Lemma 2. Furthermore, it is indicated that the PSR of the
two-level Stackelberg game increases significantly than that
of the single-level case due to the residual effect of ρps on
the secrecy of two-level case according to (3). Thirdly, we
consider same locations of PT, ST, SR and ED as same as in
Fig.2 except the different location of PR to find effect of the
destination location on the allocation of primary and secondary
power and time resources. Fig. 4 plots the optimum PSR, RSR
and SSR versus SNR. It is noted that the optimum secrecy
rates of three phases increase significantly with SNR due to
the increased ρps, ρsp and ρss.
Fig. 4: Secrecy rate versus SNR
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed a multi-level Stackelberg game
based cooperation scheme to optimize the PHY layer security
of both primary and secondary transmissions in CRNs. In
particular, we formulated and solved an optimization problem
aiming at maximizing the achievable secrecy rates on the
primary, relay and secondary transmissions subject to power
allocation and lease time slot constraints. Numerical results
confirmed that our proposed cooperative scheme significantly
improves the secrecy rates of CRNs.
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